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In February the SPDC military government announced that a referendum will be 
held this May, to 
endorse a new constitution. Following the referendum (presumably, if the regime 
is successful in 
engineering a 'yes' vote) elections are scheduled for 2010. 
The government-controlled constitution-drafting process of 1993-2007 did not 
involve significant 
participation from elected representatives (the NLD, and 67 ethnic nationality 
MPs-elect, including five 
from the MNDF). Although several ceasefire groups (especially the NMSP and KIO) 
attempted to 
include federal principles in the constitution, their efforts were frustrated by
the government. Under the 
new charter -which has not yet been made public -the Burma Army would control 
25% of the seats in 
parliament, as well as the key portfolios of defence, home affairs and border 
affairs. The military would 
also retain institutional autonomy, and control the police and paramilitary 
organizations. Therefore the 
new constitution is widely perceived as deeply flawed. 
The basic territorial division of the country into seven ethnic States and seven
predominantly (but not 
exclusively) Burman-populated Divisions would be retained in the new 
constitution, with the creation of 
new semi-autonomous, sub-provincial administrations for six ethnic nationality 
groups (five in Shan 
State). The new constitutional arrangements would provide for legislatures, with
very limited powers, at 
the state level, while at the central level there would be a lower ‘house of the
people’ (Pyithu Hluttaw) 
elected by popular vote, and an upper house (Amyotha Hluttaw), containing equal 
numbers of 
representatives from each of the Divisions and States. 
It is worth asking whether this new structure, despite its obvious faults, might
allow for a slightly more 
open expression of political views. For example, it may be that the new 
legislative assemblies will find 
some freedom to debate important issues. The creation of ethnic State 
legislatures may allow for the 
participation of local political and civil society organizations, in at least 
some sectors of public life, as 
well as providing a forum to argue for greater allocation of resources to ethnic
nationality-populated 
areas. 
According to this view, any constitution is better than continued direct rule by
the military. Although the 
space available to ethnic nationality and other parties under the new 
constitution is likely to be very 
limited, it will at least allow them to participate in above-ground politics, 
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from ‘within the legal fold’. 
Regarding the referendum -calls to boycott the process, or vote 'No', are 
understandable. However, the 
referendum seems to represents a 'win-win' situation for the military 
government: if the constitution is 
rejected, presumably this will mean many more years of military rule, while the 
generals take their time 
before presenting new proposals. 
Regarding any future election -whatever its deficiencies, this will probably 
confer at least a degree of 
legitimacy upon those elected. Ethnic nationality politicians and communities 
are therefore likely to be 
faced with a dilemma, regarding whether and how to participate in elections 
organized by the SPDC. 
It will be interesting to observe whether -given the choice -ethnic nationality 
communities will choose to 
support all-Burma parties (such as the NLD), or to endorse specifically 
ethno-nationalist groups. 
Historically, elites representing some ethnic groups, such as the Mon, have 
successfully competed in 
elections in Burma (e.g. in the 1950s and in 1990), while others, such as the 
Karen, have not. Will the 
ceasefire groups be prepared to risk testing their electoral popularity? Despite
several positive 
developments since the ceasefires (such as the re-emergence of civil society 
networks, which I have 
written about in detail elsewhere), the continuation of human and 
civil-political rights abuses have led 
many to criticise these agreements. Such complaints have weakened the standing 
of most ceasefire 
groups, at least in some sectors of the community. This is a common phenomenon 
in post-conflict 
situations: leaders and organisations which are prepared to make political 
compromises often find their 
position undermined by 'hard-line' critics. 
One of the most important and interesting questions, thirteen years after the 
ceasefire, is what the future 
holds for the NMSP. The party still retains most of the characteristics, and 
opposition-oriented political 
culture, of an insurgent organization. Will the NMSP be able to re-invent itself
as a dynamic political 
party (and rival to the partly-dormant MNDF) -or will it continue to guard the 
frontiers of the ceasefire 
zone, while exercising a declining influence over the wider Mon population? 
While it may be argued that Burma's armed ethnic groups have little to gain from
participating in future 

elections, something is perhaps better than nothing. A continuation of the 
present armed stand-off 
mostly benefits the military government, at a time when the regime is undergoing
a generational change, 
and seems to be establishing the ground rules for politics in Burma over the 
coming decade. 
Ashley South is an independent writer and consultant on humanitarian and 
political issues in Burma and 
South-East Asia. This article is derived from his forthcoming book, 'Ethnic 
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